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STATEMENT OF THE CA$E

A.

Jurisdiction and Issues.

Assuming that Mangum!s

Statement of Jurisdiction intended to cite Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(c),
the City is satisfied with the allegation of jurisdiction, and
it will accept the Statement of Issues as set out by Mangum
because it is his perception of those issues that gives rise to
the appeal in the first instance.
B.

Recitation of Facts.

Mangum1s statement of the facts

is not objective or accurate in certain particulars.

For

example, whether the police made proper inquiry of the
Defendant is the first issue on appeal, according to Mangum's
Statement of Issues, and yet in the second paragraph on Page 3

it is given

as a fact

that

proper

inquiry

was not made of

the

Defendant by the police.
Th$ evidence shows that during the early morning hours of
October 25, 1987, the police responded to a "peeping torn"
report, and in fact the reporting party described the actions
of the Suspected peeper to the police dispatcher who relayed
them to police officers as they arrived at the sc^ne itself.
(Tr. p.27, 1. 9-10, 1.18-20;

p.34, 1.5-11).

Standing alone in

a dark Qarport adjacent to the area where the peeper was
sighted, the officers encountered the Defendant dressed in the
manner described by the reporting party.
p.27 1.5-7;

p.28 1.16-18).
2

(Tr. p.28 1.4-9;

The officers explained their

mission and the Defendant gave an account of his actions,
p. 29 1.9-14).

(Tr.

The Defendant's explanation denied any peeping,

but it did acknowledge that he had "looked at some houses that
he had worked on out there'1.

The Defendant was later joined by

his brother and the officers left him thejre, at the home of his
brother, after the investigation.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS)
After an eyewitness report of the actions and description
of a man in a backyard at a very late hour peeping in a window,
a police officer located the Defendant alone, in the dark, at a
carport adjacent to the site of the peeping.

The police had a

right to measure the credibility of his account with the
yardstick of information and circumstances already known to
them in order to determine whether the account was reasonable
and credible or not.

An arrest need not take place at the time

of the incident, and a defendant need not be taken into custody
if he is in a place and with others that should dispel any
alarm or concern about further occurrence of unlawful acts.
The evidence presented in the lower court was sufficient to
support the judgment of that court, and Mangum has not borne
the burden of showing error or abuse of discretion by the trial
court which would provide basis for overturning its judgment.

ARGUMENT
I.

ADEQUATE INQUIRY WAS MADE OF THE DEFENDANT BY THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
3

Sec.

76-9-703, Utah Code Annotated, contemplates such

inquiry by the law enforcement official as will produce an
explanation of the suspect's conduct and purpose for being in
the area.

While the testifying officer did not state that

inquiry in his exact words as used on the night in question, he
advised the court that they "told him what (they) were there
for".

(Tr. p. 29 1.10).

The trial court is justified in

concluding from that statement that the officer made known to
Mangum that they suspected him of peeping and had come to
ascertain if their suspicions were correct.

In any event, it

produced an account by Mangum, as he denied peeping but advised
that he had been in the backyards of the homes in order to look
at a house he had worked on at some prior time.

(Tr. p.29,

1.13-14).
As stated in 1984 by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
a case arising out of this state, Harmon City, Inc. vs. United
States, 733 F.2d 1381, at 1385:
"Where the trial is to the court, the resolution of
factual issues and conflicting evidence remains
solely within the province of the district court.
Such findings of a trial court, even those involving
evaluation of expert testimony, cannot be disturbed
on appeal unless found to be clearly erroneous.
(Cases cited)"
The determination of the lower court that sufficient inquiry
was made by the police officer and that it elicited the
required accounting should not be disturbed on appeal.

The

need for an inquiry would be a matter of law, but where there
4

was an inquiry, its adequacy would be a question of fact.
Determination of that fact question by the trier of fact, even
in a criminal case, is not properly the subject of review by an
appellate court.

Jackson vs. Virginia (1979, U.S.) 61 L.Ed.2d

560, 99 S.Ct. 2781.
II.

REASONABLENESS AND CREDIBILITY OF MANGUMfS ACCOUNT OF
HIS CONDUCT OR PURPOSE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DISPEL
ALARM.
The police officer's evaluation of the reasonableness

and credibility of Mangum's account is certainly a question of
fact.

The facts already known to him establish that alarm

existed in the minds of certain of the residents of the
neighborhood.

(Tr. p.26 1.23;

p.27 1.3^5.

In addition to the

very late hour, the facts known to the officer included
"peeking in the windows11 and "running behind (the) house".

In

that known context, the officer was required to evaluate
Mangum's account and adjudge its credibility.

The fact that

Mangum had been hunting earlier in the day did not in any way
account for his presence alone in a dark carport at 1:30 a.m.,
and the further statement that he had been back "look(ing) at
some houses that he had worked on out there" could very easily
have been determined by the officer to be inadequate and not
credible.

Surrounding circumstances, such as the description

of Mangum and his clothing by the neighbor who observed the
peeking, and footprints by the officer that led through the mud
in the area of the merging and unfenced backyards were also
5

properly used by the officer in evaluating the credibility and
reasonableness of Mangum's explanation of his presence and
actions there.

These were presented to the court and used as a

part of the basis for the court's decision, along with other
evidenciary matters and opportunities for the court to hear and
observe witnesses.

The denial of Mangum and his allegation

that the officers wouldn't give him a proper hearing at the
scene were only a part of the evidence which the court had
before it for consideration.
III.

FAILURE OF THE OFFICER TO TAKE MANGUM INTO CUSTODY OR
OTHERWISE REMOVE HIM FROM THE AREA DOES NOT NEGATE
ALARM.
As Mangum was at his brotherfs home (a next door

neighbor), and because he was subsequently joined by his
brother and sister-in-law, there was good reason for the
officer to believe that Mangum would not again go into the
interior of the block where the backyards merged or do further
peeping.

The secretive nature of that particular occupation is

one that makes it unlikely to reoccur once the spotlight of
notoriety has been focused upon it.

The evidence showed that

the officers had contact with the adjoining neighbor who, with
her daughter, had evidenced the alarm, and he was satisfied
that the alarm had abated without necessity of removing Mangum
from the neighborhood.

Under the facts that existed, the

officer's decision to not remove Mangum was no evidence that
the alarm required by Sec. 76-9-703, UCA, had not previously
6

existed.
IV.

IT WAS NOT ERROR OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL
COURT TO FIND ON THE EVIDENCE THAT MANGUM HAD BEEN
PROVEN GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
A.

The factfinder found that the evidence adequately

established Mangum as the peeping party observed by the
witness.

The witness had observed the peeper there immediately

prior to the officers finding Mangum. (Tr. p.27 1.18-21).
did not see anyone else in that area.

They

(Tr. p.32 1.13-15).

Mangum1s brother came out later, but the witnesses all agreed
that he was dressed quite differently than Mangum himself.

The

witness described his clothing, and the only discrepancy was
that she believed he was wearing a dark parka when in fact he
was wearing a blue cap.

The only other persons in the area

appeared later, and either wore a police uniform or, in the
case of Mangum1s brother, were dressed very differently.

The

eyewitness, Mrs. Hintze, saw Mangum when the police officers
were talking to him and definitely confirmed that it was the
man she had previously observed behind the houses and peeping.
(Tr. p.12 1.16-18).

Again, the trial court had unique

opportunity to evaluate the testimony of the various witnesses,
and it determined that adequate identification of Mangum had
been made.
B.

Where there is substantial evidence to support the

trial court's judgment, it should be upheld on appeal.

This

has been held by the courts to mean that the finding of fact by
7

the trial court must be clearly erroneous, leaving the
appellate court with the definite and firm conviction that
undisputed evidence in the record compels a contrary factual
conclusion.

However, reversal is not appropriate unless that

judgment is found to be clearly erroneous, since the trial
judge who heard and saw witnesses is first and best judge of
the weight and value to be given to all evidence, and it is the
trial judge who determines credibility of witnesses.

Smith vs.

Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (1980, CAlO) 614 F.2d 720;

Brigham

Young University vs. Lillywhite (CAlO) 118 F.2d 836, 137 A.L.R.
598, cert. den. 314 U.S. 638, 62L.Ed.2d 512, 62 S.Ct. 73.

It

is the trial court, and not the appellate court, which must be
convinced of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
People vs. Robillard, 55 Cal.2d 88, 10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d
295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086, cert. den. 365 U.S. 886, 6 L.Ed.2d 199,
81 S.Ct. 1043.

The evidence presented in the lower court will

be viewed by the appellate court in such manner as to support
the decision appealed from where this is reasonably possible;
in other words, the evidence and the reasonable inferences
arising therefrom must be considered in the light most
favorable to the City.

Austad vs. Austad, 2 Ut.2d 49, 269 P.2d

284, 48 A.L.R.2d 256.

CONCLUSION
The evidence taken as a whole affords adequate basis for
8

the trial court's finding of guilty on the part of Mangum.
Clear sighting was had by a witness over a period of time, this
was communicated at length to the police department by
telephone as the events took place, Mangum was found at the
scene without reasonable explanation as to his activities, and
the eyewitness identified him as the prowler she had seen.

if

Mangum1s account of his conduct had been reasonable or
credible, his appeal would have some merit, but it is not
reasonable to go through the interior of a block after midnight
to look at a house one had worked on, and Mangum1s statement to
that effect was not plausible in the light of surrounding
circumstances known to the officer.

The trial court properly

found the Defendant guilty based upon its application of the
facts as it found them to the ordinance under which Mangum was
charged.
DATED this 9th day of May, 198J
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St. George, Utah 84770
Attorney for Appellee
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